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Introduction
Two things are required to connect a home computer to the network of comput-
ers that constitutes the Internet: a physical connection (or line) and an Internet
Service Provider (ISP). During the 1990s, when the Internet was in its infancy,
all home users connected to the Internet by signing a contract with an ISP and
programming their modems to “dial up” the ISP server. The physical connec-
tion was provided by the telephone company, and it was relatively simple to
change ISPs. From a technical standpoint, “dialling up” was not unlike dialling
another telephone subscriber. In the case of a traditional telephone call, the user
dialled into the network of switches owned and controlled by the telephone
companies, which then completed the call. In the case of Internet service, the
user dialled an ISP server that provided software for routing message packets
through the Internet. 
In the jargon of the telecommunications industry, the infrastructure that con-
nects a subscriber’s telephone to a central office (or first switch) is referred to as
“last-mile technology” or “the last-mile network.” With the advent of the Internet,
last-mile infrastructure was simply adapted to a new type of access service:
Internet access. Because the last-mile connection was provided by telephone
companies operating as regulated public utilities, traditional principles of com-
mon carriage applied. Moreover, the Internet itself embodied a fundamental prin-
ciple of common carriage: the non-discriminatory treatment of messages.
Although both components of the system (last-mile access and the Internet per se)
respected principles of common carriage, they did so for very different reasons,
which will be explored in the next section.
Last-mile infrastructure is the most costly component of the wireline (tele-
phone and cable) infrastructure. From the point of view of network providers, it
embodies a significant “sunk cost”—one that cannot be sold off or economically
duplicated by potential competitors. It is largely for this reason that local access
service (local telephony) has been the last segment of the old legacy telephone
network to be subject to competition, while the market for long-distance services
and terminal equipment (devices such as telephones and modems) has been effec-
tively competitive for over two decades. 
In 2005, the last-mile network became the focus of public scrutiny in the
United States. But the issue was not the slow advance of competition in markets
for local telephone service; rather, the issue was access to high-speed Internet.
Internet access providers such as Southwestern Bell began to postulate a new
Internet that would discriminate between Internet applications and charge service
providers, such as Google and Yahoo!, a premium to access subscribers via their
last-mile network. Significantly, these proposals coincided with efforts by the for-
mer telephone companies to upgrade their last-mile networks to fibre optic
(broadband) technology. The Internet community responded to these calls for a
two-speed or “two-tiered” Internet with calls for “network neutrality” legislation
that would make it illegal to discriminate between Internet applications. It is my
contention that the telephone companies are seeking additional revenue sources
via service tiers because of the tremendous costs associated with the upgrade to
true broadband and not simply because of opportunities for profit. By extension,
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it is the search for additional sources of revenue to finance investment in last-mile
broadband that is the impetus for the network neutrality debate. 
In this article, I argue that the network neutrality debate needs to be re-
framed in order to incorporate the public interest as it pertains to universal access
to broadband connections to the Internet. Public debate on Internet neutrality pro-
vides a unique opportunity to consider larger, more fundamental issues related to
infrastructure development—more specifically, what policies need to be imple-
mented if we are to ensure not only that the Internet remains “neutral,” but also,
and just as importantly, that incentives will exist for investment in last-mile, high-
speed networks. In what follows, we will undertake an historical reading of pub-
lic policy related to principles of common carriage and the non-discriminatory
treatment of messages. This will be done first in the context of traditional public-
utility regulation and then in the context of the Internet. This will be followed by
an analysis and comparison of the American and Canadian debates on Internet
neutrality. Finally, we will analyze and critique current policy discourses on net-
work economics and Internet neutrality in order to argue that the most efficient
policy for ensuring principles of non-discrimination is to increase absolute band-
width in the last-mile network. In order for this to occur, policymakers will have
to design policies that create real incentives for network operators to invest in
last-mile infrastructure.
Common carriage and access to the Internet
Traditional common carriers were coachmen, teamsters, ferrymen, and operators
of canal boats engaged in the transportation of people and goods to the general
public. In the nineteenth century, railroads were added to the list of common car-
riers. For centuries under common law, and later under public-utility regulation,
these enterprises were subject to special economic treatment. They were viewed
as businesses “vested with a public interest” because of the vital role they played
in the general commerce of the nation. Horwitz has described the traditional obli-
gations of common carriers in the following way: “they must serve all, they must
provide adequate (and safe) facilities, they must charge reasonable rates, they
must not discriminate against customers” (1989, p. 59). 
The framework for state control of common carriers in the modern era was
developed in conjunction with the regulation of the railroad industry. It was a
simple matter to apply the common-carrier concept developed for the railroad
industry to the telegraph and telephone industries. The obligation not to discrim-
inate in the “transportation” of information was seen as just as vital to the public
interest as the obligation not to discriminate in the transport of goods or people.
For example, telegraph operators were instructed to send messages based on the
order received. 
As the telephone industry matured, local telephone service assumed the sta-
tus of a geographic monopoly (one provider per local calling area) throughout
North America. With monopoly came pressure to regulate prices. Alfred Vail, the
founder of AT&T, met the challenge of price regulation by arguing that the tele-
phone industry was a “natural” monopoly. Accordingly, when AT&T accepted
price regulation, it did so on the condition that governments protect the industry
from “unfair” competition from unregulated carriers. The commitment to non-
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discriminatory carriage in the context of regulated monopoly was so fundamen-
tal that it led to a more general policy known as the “separation of content and
carriage.” To ensure that they would have no economic incentive to discriminate
in the transport of messages, telephone common carriers were forbidden, as a
condition of licence, to own newspapers, publishers, broadcasters, or other pro-
ducers of content. Their operations were limited strictly to the business of basic
common carriage. For example, Bell Canada’s federal charter prohibited the com-
pany from holding shares in other companies that were not involved in the pro-
vision of telephone service (Canada, 1880).
In Canada the federally regulated telephone companies, principally Bell
Canada and BC Tel prior to 1993, were regulated under the Railway Act. In 1993
the Railway Act was superseded by the Telecommunications Act (Canada, 1993),
and federal jurisdiction was expanded to include virtually all of Canada’s tele-
phone companies. This was the result of a Supreme Court decision (Supreme
Court of Canada, 1989). A recent CRTC discussion paper submitted to the
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel notes that public policy with respect
to telecommunications has been grounded in a consistent set of principles: (1)
universal service, (2) the requirement that the telephone companies “treat their
customers in a fair and non-discriminatory manner,” and (3) network connectiv-
ity (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2005,
paragraph 29). Although developed in conjunction with the regulation of tele-
phone service, these principles continue to serve as the basis for CRTC policy
and regulation with respect to new services and facilities, including broadband
access to the Internet. Moreover, the proscription against discrimination has
been enshrined in the Telecommunications Act, which states: “No Canadian car-
rier shall, in relation to the provision of a telecommunications service or the
charging of a rate for it, unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable
preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue
or unreasonable disadvantage” (Canada, 1993, 27.3). 
Policies promoting network connectivity have been interpreted in a fairly
broad manner to include facilities and services used in conjunction with the
Internet. Very early in the evolution of the telephone industry, regulators recog-
nized that it was in the public interest to require maximum interconnection of net-
works. In the era of digital networks, this has meant that regulators have resisted
attempts to create proprietary networks based on software and hardware that are
incompatible with other networks. The Internet protocol (IP) used to transmit data
over the Internet is the quintessential open network architecture and the backbone
of policy designed to promote maximum interconnection. Connectivity, unlike
principles of non-discrimination, is not a legal concept. But it has been a funda-
mental component of public policy with respect to common carriers for over a
century in Canada. 
As noted previously, the other component of the Internet experience is the
Internet itself: the digital network of networks responsible for routing message
packets between computers located throughout the world. For very different rea-
sons, the Internet backbone network also functions according to one of the fun-
damental principles of common carriage: the non-discriminatory treatment of
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packets. However, the reasons for this are not a function of public-utility econom-
ics that have governed the telephone industry; rather, they are matter of technol-
ogy, network design, and Internet culture. 
Since its origins in the ARPANET, the genius of the Internet has been found
in its packet structure: the way that it disassembles messages into discrete packets,
assigns each packet a header that identifies the sending computer and the destina-
tion computer, and sends each packet to the destination computer (independently
of the other packets), where the packets are finally re-assembled. In theory, pack-
ets associated with the same message may follow different paths to the destination
computer. This architecture takes advantage of the inherently “bursty” character of
digital transmission. For the purposes of transmission, the actual message
(whether an e-mail, a file transfer, or an HTML page) is not a meaningful unit.
Rather, the message has become a stream of packets. Packets are routed through
the network of Internet nodes in a “best effort” attempt to respect the principle of
“first come, first served.” In order to discriminate, the network would have to dis-
tinguish between one person’s packets and another’s, or more precisely, between
packets originating in one computer and packets originating in another. Because
we are dealing with programmable computers, this can be done, but it requires that
a new level of programming be introduced to the network, one that substitutes for
the traditional protocol of first come, first served. To summarize, the Internet does
not generally discriminate between computers, Internet users, or their messages,
because it was designed to operate at the level of the packet and was not designed
to discriminate between packets. 
It would appear that the Internet has been infused with principles of common
carriage as a result of its early and continuing association with the telephone
industry at the level of the access network, but also as a result of its egalitarian
design and open architecture. Moreover, the early history of its use and co-oper-
ative development reinforces the notion of the Internet as a public good.
Setting the stage for the Internet neutrality debate: 
The demise of open access policy in the United States
During the 1990s, when dial-up connections to the Internet were the norm, the
FCC and the CRTC determined that the telephone companies would be allowed
to function as Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This presented challenges to
longstanding principles of non-discrimination and connectivity. But the decision
to allow telephone companies to act as ISPs did not represent a fundamental
break with policy trends; rather, it was the culmination of a gradual shift in pol-
icy that had begun decades before the arrival of the Internet. 
In a series of decisions known as “Computer I” (1971), “II” (1980), and “III”
(1985), the FCC established, and subsequently revised, the rules that would allow
telephone carriers to engage in what were then referred to as “hybrid or enhanced
services.” Essentially, enhanced services were services that went beyond basic
transmission (common carriage) to include data or information processing.
Although it is hard for us to imagine today, services such as call-waiting and
voice mail were controversial because they added value using information pro-
cessing. The Justice Department’s Consent Decree of 1956 (United States v.
Western Electric Co., 1956) prescribed that AT&T and its subsidiary local Bells
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could only operate in regulated markets. With the advent of digital switching in
the 1960s, it was possible to add functions to the basic telephone service based
on the information processing capabilities of the computer. But information pro-
cessing was the domain of companies such as IBM operating in markets that were
not subject to public-utility regulation. Moreover, data services such as electronic
mail and videotext (a precursor of the Internet) also fell on the other side of the
regulatory divide. The Computer I, II, and III decisions established the rules for
common-carrier participation in markets for services that went beyond basic
transmission. 
In November 1983, the CRTC issued a major decision on enhanced services
that essentially copied the U.S. framework outlined in Computer II, Telecom
Decision CRTC 84-18 (CRTC, 1984). Eventually, telephone companies in the
U.S. and Canada would be allowed to provide enhanced voice and data services.
However, this sanction was conditional: it required that the telephone companies
not discriminate against competitors providing similar enhanced services. For
example, the telephone companies in the United States were required to provide
these services through structurally separate subsidiaries for years. 
With the advent of the Internet, the shift in policy that enabled the telephone
companies to provide more than basic transmission was extended to the provision
of Internet access. Again regulatory approval was subject to the requirement that
the telephone companies (telcos) not discriminate against other service providers.
In telecommunications, this was known as the policy of “open access.” Open
access is a form of structural regulation that requires providers of last-mile con-
nections (primarily the telephone companies) to operate as bandwidth wholesalers
to service retailers such as ISPs. Allowing the telephone companies to act as both
wholesalers and retailers (ISPs) with respect to data transmission created the
potential for the telephone companies to discriminate against third-party retailers.
But it did not entail a change in policy with respect to the more fundamental sep-
aration of content and carriage, as ISPs were viewed as essentially gateways to
third-party content providers and not as producers of content/information. 
While the structural requirement of open access applied to the telephone
companies, it was less clear whether cable operators should be subject to the same
open access requirements when providing broadband connections to the Internet.
This was due to the fact that, historically, cable companies in both the United
States and Canada have not been regulated as common carriers, but rather as
broadcasters—more specifically, as distributors of broadcast programming.
When U.S. ISPs attempted to force cable companies to provide them with access
to their last-mile infrastructure, the cable companies refused on the grounds that
they were not common carriers. 
In the United States, the issue went all the way to the Supreme Court. In a
landmark ruling in 2005, National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X
Internet Services (Supreme Court of the United States, 2005), the Court sided with
the cable industry. The court ruled that the FCC was correct when it determined
that cable modem service was akin to an “information service” (and not a telecom-
munications service) under the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 (United
States, 1996). It followed that cable operators did not have to provide Internet con-
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nections to competitor ISPs such as Brand X. This had immediate resonance in the
telephone sector, where the telephone companies argued that regulation was asym-
metrical. To the extent that telephone and cable operators were providing compa-
rable broadband facilities, it was unfair to subject only the telephone sector to open
access requirements. In the wake of the Brand X decision, the FCC re-classified
telco DSL service. Thereafter, it would no longer be viewed as a telecommunica-
tions service, but rather as an information service (United States, 2005). With this
order, the FCC, with the complicity of the courts, effectively abrogated the policy
of open access to broadband facilities in the United States. 
Canada has not witnessed a reversal of open access policy comparable with
the United States. In its submission to the Telecommunications Policy Review
Panel, the CRTC reaffirmed the Canadian equivalent of “open access.” In para-
graph 141 of the report, the Commission noted its long-standing commitment to
“facilities-based competition as the best means to realize the benefits of compe-
tition in terms of price, innovation and choice and as the best means of ultimately
forbearing from regulation of the ILECs’ services” (CRTC, 2005). The
Commission continued by stating that the policy promoting facilities-based com-
petition was itself an integral component of a more comprehensive policy
designed to promote “a competitive network of networks with numerous other
service providers accessing and utilizing those networks on reasonable terms and
conditions. . .” (paragraph 51). The report continued, “The Commission has fos-
tered service-based competition and resale activity by ensuring access by service
providers to the networks and services of facilities-based carriers” (paragraph
51; emphasis added). 
Although it may be tempting to infer that traditional common-carrier princi-
ples have been abandoned with the abrogation of open access policy in the United
States, one could just as easily argue that common-carrier principles, and in par-
ticular the requirement of non-discriminatory treatment, are more important than
ever before. This is the case because in the post–dial-up market for high-speed
access, the consumer only has two access options: telephone or cable. The mar-
ket for broadband access is essentially an oligopoly.
Making the others pay: SBC registers its dissatisfaction with the
current regime for generating and distributing Internet revenues
By most accounts, the controversy over network neutrality began in November
2005. In an interview with BusinessWeek Online, the CEO of SBC (formerly
Southwestern Bell Company; AT&T since 2006), Edward Whitacre, was asked
whether he was concerned about Internet “upstarts” such as Google. Whitacre
responded:
How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a broad-
band pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they
would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that
because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So
there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use
these pipes to pay for the portion they’re using. Why should they be
allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because
we and the cable companies have made an investment and for a Google
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or Yahoo! [sic] or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for]
free is nuts! (O’Connell, 2005; emphasis added)
The telco position is not totally without merit. Patrick Barnard, in an article pub-
lished on the Free Press website, has noted:
Verizon Communications Inc.’s market capitalization is about $88 billion
today, whereas it was $111 billion a year ago. Conversely, Google Inc.,
which relies in part on Verizon’s network to deliver its services, saw its
market capitalization grow from $53 billion to $133 billion during the
same time period. Allowing the phone companies to charge for premium
bandwidth would help tip the see-saw back in their favor. (Barnard, 2006)
Equipment manufacturers such as Cisco Systems have also been keen to alert
broadband providers to the fact that they “‘risk’ allowing their broadband service
to become viewed as a ‘low-priced bulk commodity’” (Chester, 2006). 
It was no coincidence that Whitacre’s interview took place in November 2005,
following the Brand X decision and the subsequent FCC order re-classifying DSL
as an information service. The FCC order had the immediate effect of placing the
telcos and cablecos (cable companies) on a more even competitive footing in the
market for broadband access to the Internet. However, the telcos would still be at
a competitive disadvantage. Because high-speed DSL relies on the old last-mile
telephone infrastructure based on copper wires, it does not have the bandwidth
capacity of the coaxial cable already deployed by the cable industry. With the
spectre of open access requirements removed, the way is now open for U.S. and
Canadian telcos to compete with the cable companies on equal footing in terms of
bandwidth. But in order for this to occur, the telcos will have to accelerate their
deployment of fibre optic technology in their last-mile infrastructure. 
Although the link between the Brand X decision and Whitacre’s remarks has
been noted by a number of commentators, the connection between Whitacre’s
remarks and the telco project to upgrade to fibre optics has not been explored. It
is important to understand that there is nothing new about this project. The indus-
try has long known that it would have to meet the challenge of cable broadband
with its own true broadband offering. The introduction of DSL technology in the
late 1990s merely postponed the competitive showdown. The fact that the telcos
have postponed this upgrade for more than two decades is a revealing indicator
of the tremendous costs and risks this project entails. For example, Verizon alone
has announced plans to invest US$20 billion by the year 2010 to reach 16 million
residential subscribers from Florida to California (Belson, 2006). 
Beyond the Brand X decision, how does one explain the telcos’ decision to
upgrade their networks at this juncture? Essentially the telcos are responding to a
triple threat of competition from the cable industry. True competition began 10
years ago, when both telcos and cable companies began to offer Internet access
service. More recently, and as direct result of deregulation, cable companies in
the United States and Canada have begun to offer local telephone service. It is
now possible for cable companies to combine Internet access and local telephony
with their legacy television distribution business and to market them to con-
sumers as a comprehensive bundle of communications services. Should the tele-
phone companies fail to upgrade to fibre optic technology relatively soon, they
88 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (1)
will lose the bundling battle and find themselves relegated to the role of custodi-
ans of the old copper telephone network.
How service tiers would work
Whitacre’s remarks did more than signal telco dissatisfaction with the current
regime for generating and distributing Internet revenues. They suggested where
the telcos will turn for additional sources of revenue. The first source of revenues
will be higher service fees for access to true broadband. But there will also be sig-
nificant opportunities to recover investment in broadband facilities indirectly. In
today’s deregulated, postconvergence market for telecommunications, a broad-
band operator may own content or programming delivered via its facilities. More
controversial is the service-tier option, where a system of “back-door tolls”
would be introduced to extract additional revenues from up-market providers of
Internet services such as Google and Yahoo!. Although these fees will ultimately
be passed on to end users, they will not appear as part of the Internet subscriber’s
monthly access fee. From the telco/cable perspective, charging service providers
a premium to send certain types of content to end users represents an expedient
means of recouping investment in last-mile broadband infrastructure. 
Two techniques of traffic management will make these back-door tolls pos-
sible: “flow classification” and “deep packet inspection.” Flow classification
looks at factors such as the size of packets in a stream and the amount of time
between consecutive packets “to make reasonable determinations about the
nature of the packet stream” (Peha, 2006, p. 4). Deep packet inspection entails
inspecting and identifying information packets at a deeper level, known as the
“application layer” of the Internet protocol, where it is possible to discern the type
of content being transmitted, such as music, video, games, and VoIP (Voice over
Internet Protocol). The technology is being promoted by equipment manufactur-
ers such as Cisco Services that provide routers to the Internet service providers.
A recent Cisco Systems white paper states:
The Cisco Service Control Platform is comprised of a programmable net-
work element that creates an intelligent overlay, enabling network opera-
tors to identify subscribers, classify application-level traffic, guarantee
service performance and charge for content-based services. The solution
allows providers to address the gaps in premium service deployment and
to customize solutions for individual subscribers while effectively charg-
ing for new service offers. (Cisco Systems, 2005, p. 2; emphasis added)
An Internet access provider, cable or telephone, can use this technology to
create “service tiers” based on application type. Differentiating services based on
the applications they use will enable Internet service providers to exploit demand
elasticities for different services, charging a premium for the delivery of high-end
services such as video. The technology is ideally suited to broadband networks
that are capable of transmitting packets at the high speeds required for music,
gaming, and especially video applications.
Unfortunately for the broadband operators, these schemes run counter to the
economics and culture of the Internet, where a “packet is a packet,” irrespective
of its content or formatting. Alert to this threat, activists have attempted to add
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network neutrality clauses to communication bills before the U.S. Congress. The
debate on network neutrality is, therefore, largely anticipatory. It is an attempt to
prevent the broadband carriers (who in most cases are also operating as ISPs)
from discriminating between different types of content and, most importantly,
from implementing price discrimination based on this information.
The response
Whitacre’s remarks provoked an immediate response from the Internet commu-
nity. A “Save the Internet Coalition” (http://savetheinternet.com) was formed to
lobby Congress for net neutrality legislation. A major conference was organized
in April 2006, called F2C: Freedom to Connect 2006 (http://freedom-to-con-
nect.net/2006. Internet founder Tim Berners-Lee registered his concern, noting
that in Europe, network neutrality is the rule (Bennett, 2006). 
On March 2, 2006, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced net neutral-
ity legislation. Wyden’s bill proposed that network operators “not interfere with,
block, degrade, alter, modify, impair, or change any bits, content, application or
service transmitted over the network of such operator” (United States Senate,
2006b). On May 18, 2006, U.S. Senators Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Byron
Dorgan (D-ND), members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, also introduced net neutrality legislation (United States Senate,
2006a); however, on June 28th, the Senate Committee rejected the amendment by
a vote of 11 to 11. On June 8th, the U.S. House of Representatives also rejected a
net neutrality amendment proposed by Congressman Markey of Massachusetts,
HR5273 (United States Senate, 2006c), this time by a vote of 269 to 152.
Essentially, these amendments to the pending communications act would have
made it impossible for broadband carriers (both telephone and cable) to imple-
ment a multitiered Internet. 
In their efforts to oppose the Internet neutrality amendments, the telcos and
cablecos resorted to the predictable old saw of the “perils” of regulation.
Moreover, key agencies of the U.S. government, including the Federal Trade
Commission and the FCC, entered the debate on the side of broadband operators
when they endorsed the regulatory status quo. The position of regulatory laissez-
faire has been neatly summarized by the chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, Deborah Platt Majoras. Speaking on the subject of network neutral-
ity in August 2006, she noted “I. . . question the starting assumption that govern-
ment regulation, rather than the market itself under existing laws, will provide the
best solution to a problem” (Mark, 2006). The FCC chairman, Kevin Martin, has
been similarly reactive, noting that enacting net neutrality legislation would be
premature (Reardon, 2006).
In Canada there has been no attempt to legislate Internet neutrality. In 2006 the
issue was before then Minister of Industry responsible for communications,
Maxime Bernier, in conjunction with his department’s review of the
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel Final Report (Industry Canada, 2006).
According to documents obtained by Canadian Press, senior advisors to Bernier are
sympathetic to the arguments of the largest telecommunications companies, such as
TELUS and Videotron, which oppose neutrality measures (Goodman, 2007).
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How neutral is the Internet?
To what extent do practices designed to shape, manage, or otherwise purposefully
control the flow of traffic over the Internet represent a challenge to traditional
common-carrier principles of non-discrimination? The answer to this question is
more complicated and nuanced than either proponents of tiered service (the
broadband carriers) or their opponents (the advocates of neutrality legislation)
seem prepared to acknowledge. 
In a paper entitled “The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network
Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy,” Jon M. Peha, associate director
of Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for Wireless and Broadband Networking,
provided a fairly broad, but useful, definition of discrimination in a network con-
text. According to Peha, discrimination occurs “whenever a network treats some
network traffic or some network users differently from others” (Peha, 2006, p. 3).
By Peha’s definition, today’s Internet already encompasses practices that are dis-
criminatory, something that opponents of neutrality legislation have been keen to
note. For example, there is the problem of asymmetrical bandwidth common to
high-speed Internet service (cable modem and DSL), where download speeds are
typically three to four times faster than upload speeds. This clearly favours the
class of up-market service providers over the class of down-market Internet sub-
scribers. At the application level, this configuration favours one-to-many applica-
tions over one-to-one (peer) applications such as file-sharing applications. 
McTaggart (2006) notes that networks may have bilateral “peering” agree-
ments that give preferential treatment to each other’s traffic. Because these
arrangements include customers of the largest ISPs, traffic crossing between
peered networks will be transmitted at a discount. Smaller ISPs that do not ben-
efit from peering arrangements (and their customers) will pay more. Moreover,
network operators may employ “hot-potato” policies designed to push traffic that
does not terminate in their own network outside their network as soon as possi-
ble (McTaggart, 2006, p. 11). Finally, opponents of neutrality legislation are keen
to observe that the current “best effort” practice of “first come, first served” is
itself discriminatory, because it favours data applications (such as e-mail and Web
browsing) to the detriment of applications such as real-time video and VoIP that
are sensitive to delay (Wu, 2003). Applications that are sensitive to delays in
transmission are known as “latency sensitive.” In order to meet the requirements
of latency sensitive applications, network operators would have to implement
“quality of service” (QoS) policies that shape traffic in ways that take into
account the latency requirements of particular applications. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we find activities associated with the more
traditional notion of negative discrimination. Network operators argue that effi-
cient management of scarce network resources requires them to shape and man-
age the flow of Internet packets. For example, their ability to control applications
that are “greedy” users of bandwidth, such as peer-to-peer file-sharing applica-
tions, may enable them to keep bandwidth available for the vast majority of users,
who simply wish to browse the Web and use e-mail. 
Thus, we see that the policy principle of true (absolute) “neutrality” is some-
thing of a red herring. Current Internet routing practices already embody a certain
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degree of traffic management that must be considered discriminatory according to
Peha’s definition. For example, the most purposeful traffic-shaping activity
embodied in quality-of-service algorithms has the effect of reversing the applica-
tion-level discrimination associated with the first come, first served protocol.
Moreover, it could be argued that one of the most blatant forms of negative dis-
crimination (controlling peer-to-peer file sharing) may be compatible with the
public interest. Finally, if as a matter of public policy it is determined that the
Internet should be “application neutral,” network operators could argue that this
can only be accomplished by discriminating between packets based on the latency
requirements of the applications with which they are associated. As Peha has
noted, the key policy issue is not discrimination, but rather how to differentiate
harmful discrimination from beneficial discrimination. Of course, differentiating
between harmful and beneficial discrimination will depend on whose interests are
being served. Whitacre’s remarks are a matter for concern not because he envi-
sions differentiating between different types of applications, but rather because he
proposes to differentiate in order to price discriminate.
Challenging the premise of scarce network resources
Faced with the knowledge that demand for residential broadband may not produce
timely returns on investment, the telcos (with the complicity of the cablecos) are
resorting to an alternative financing scheme based on packet discrimination at the
application level. But how do you introduce a scheme for discriminating against
certain types of content when you are essentially operating as a broadband carrier
and the product you are carrying, whether it is e-mail, music files, or video, is
reducible in all cases to 0s and 1s—bits and bytes in a data stream? You do so by
asserting that certain applications are “greedy” users of bandwidth. Moreover, you
contend that if left unchecked, these greedy applications will monopolize scarce
network resources. 
There is one problem with these arguments: they are based on the false prem-
ise that network resources are scarce and will continue to be so. One of the for-
tuitous consequences of the dot.com boom of the late 1990s was substantial
overinvestment in long-line fibre optic infrastructure. In the investment frenzy
that preceded the dot.com bust, few questioned the notion (promulgated by net-
work operators such as Bernie Ebbers’ WorldCom) that Internet traffic was dou-
bling every 100 days (Malik, 2003). In fact, studies suggested that it was growing
at a substantially slower rate, probably doubling every year (Malik, 2003). There
was so much overbuild that most of this fibre has remained unused to this day. As
Meinrath and Pickard have noted, “Information on both where this dark fiber
exists and how much is available is considered a ‘trade secret’—keeping infor-
mation from consumers and allowing for price levels that are out-of-proportion
with the supply available” (2003, p. 17-18). 
To the extent that it may still be a factor, the dearth of bandwidth is only a
problem in the last-mile infrastructure. But the telco upgrade of this segment to
broadband virtually ensures that there will be no bandwidth shortages in the
future. Moreover, the impetus to deploy flow classification and deep packet
inspection in order to improve network efficiency is inversely related to band-
width: when absolute bandwidth increases, the requirement to manage or other-
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wise purposely shape the flow of traffic actually decreases. Stated in terms of
latency issues, latency problems diminish as bandwidth increases. Where there is
an abundance of bandwidth, the requirement to shape or prioritize traffic to
ensure application neutrality disappears. Jon Peha has noted that scarcity is, in
effect, a function of business strategy. He states:
Note that the incentive to discriminate with respect to QOS [Quality of
Service] and price is based on the assumption that there are limited
resources. In fact, a network has a choice on that. Networks can deploy
far more communications capacity than is usually needed, so congestion
is simply not a problem. Their reward is simple traffic control that can be
run on cheaper processors, simple billing systems, and pricing that can
be easily explained to customers. Alternatively, they can put money into
sophisticated traffic control and billing instead of communications
capacity. (Peha, 2006, p. 8; emphasis added)
In a similar vein, in testimony before the U.S. Senate, Gary R. Bachula, vice pres-
ident of Internet 2, has stated: 
For a number of years, we seriously explored various “quality of serv-
ice” schemes, including having our engineers convene a Quality of
Service Working Group. As it developed, though, all of our research and
practical experience supported the conclusion that it was far more cost
effective to simply provide more bandwidth. With enough bandwidth in
the network, there is no congestion and video bits do not need preferen-
tial treatment. All of the bits arrive fast enough, even if intermingled.
(Bachula, 2006, p. 2)
The telcos would appear to have become ensnared in a Gordian knot that is
largely of their own making. As they increase bandwidth in the principal network
bottleneck, the last mile, they undermine scarcity arguments for managing traffic
in the interests of network efficiency and application neutrality. Paradoxically,
their contention that they need to discriminate between packets has come at the
very juncture at which packet discrimination may no longer be required to ensure
efficient use of network resources. 
More troubling is the prospect that incentives may exist for the telcos to arbi-
trarily discriminate between classes of content (applications) or between service
providers in order to create a tiered Internet that is essentially artificial: one that
is not grounded in economic fundamentals such as bandwidth scarcity, but rather
on the broadband carriers’ ability to leverage their market power to extract prof-
its under conditions of near-monopoly. (The market for broadband access in
Canada and the U.S. is essentially an oligopoly involving the cable and telephone
industries.) Peha notes:
As in the broadband market, network operators can also deliberately
degrade service where it is helpful in capturing profits in upstream mar-
kets. As one equipment vendor put it, the ability to adjust QOS for each
upstream market ‘enables revenue sharing schemes or value-based pric-
ing rather than only “bit retailing.”’ (Peha, 2006, p. 11)
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The “new Internet”
Under what conditions will the broadband carriers be able to orchestrate a scheme
to impose premium service agreements, repositioning themselves as gatekeepers
of the new Internet while avoiding regulation? It would appear that at least two
conditions would have to be met. First, a system for differentiating bits would
have to extend to the entire market for high-speed Internet access; it would have
to be comprehensive. Second, it would require the co-operation of the most
important service providers, such as Google, Yahoo!, and YouTube. 
Let us begin with the criterion of comprehensiveness. In order for a premium-
service scheme to be credible, the telcos would have to introduce service tiers that
operate over the entire range of high-speed-access service, from DSL to upper-tier
broadband. In other words, there will be fast and slow DSL, fast and slow low-tier
broadband, and fast and slow higher-tier broadband. By “fast” and “slow,” we
mean that although the lane (or pipe) will be fast, content will move at different
speeds. More specifically, content will only move at the upper throughput speed
of the lane if some entity at the sending end has entered into a premium agreement
with the broadband provider.
Contrary to telco rhetoric, it makes little sense from a revenue standpoint to
differentiate between content based on generic criteria such as application type
(video and music files versus text messaging). What really matters is that some
entity has paid for premium access to the subscriber. Moreover, it is largely irrel-
evant from the broadband carrier’s point of view whether the premium agreement
is limited to the transmission of “greedy” applications or files such as video. The
premium agreement could just as easily incorporate the transmission of standard
Web pages at a premium speed. With respect to this practice, Tim Wu, professor
of law at Columbia University, has observed, “if AT&T would ink contracts let-
ting google.com load in one second but other search engines load in three to four
seconds, ‘that’s a serious distortion of competition in that market’” (McCullagh,
2006). From the point of view of the service provider that has entered into a pre-
mium agreement, one can easily imagine the appeal of standard Web pages that
arrive several seconds faster than those of its competitors. At this point we begin
to discern the contours of a “new Internet” that is not based on the identification
and segregation of “greedy” content but on arbitrary discrimination motivated by
opportunities for control and profit taking. 
By necessity, premium service agreements would have to operate within the
access tier subscribed to by the end user. In order for fast (premium) transmission
to be meaningful in any commercial sense, a subset of service providers must
exist whose content moves at a slower rate within the given access tier. Moreover,
as we noted previously, this content would move at a slower rate not because of
a shortage of bandwidth, but rather because these up-market providers had not
had the wherewithal to enter into a premium agreement with the access provider.
From the point of view of the service provider, the value of premium access is not
pegged to an objective measure of what constitutes “fast” transmission, but rather
to a logic of “faster than,” where “faster than” is faster than its competitors’ con-
tent. Stated more pointedly, premium access necessarily engenders a second,
slower Internet in an era of bandwidth abundance.
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The second condition runs contrary to the popular misconception that the
very largest service providers, such as Google and Yahoo!, will steadfastly resist
pressures for premium carriage—in other words, that they will refuse to deal.
Current press coverage would have one believe that the battle for net neutrality is
a battle between Internet titans, pitting the telcos and cablecos against service
providers. But this may prove to be a mirage. The very largest service providers
could transform premium-carriage agreements into an effective tool for stifling
competition from smaller or emerging providers. Yahoo! and Google would still
compete with each other for “hits,” while benefiting from a decisive advantage
when competing with smaller players. Moreover, premium carriage arrangements
would increase the value of the large service providers with respect to third par-
ties that advertise on their service or depend on the service to act as a gateway to
their destinations. Finally, premium-carriage agreements could be used as a mar-
keting tool to reinforce the loyalty of end users.
We see that the issue is not the introduction of generic service tiers designed
to tax greedy applications, but the creation of premium service agreements. These
agreements would bind the largest service providers to the broadband carriers
according to a “club logic” (Tremblay, 1997) that emphasizes exclusivity. In the
manner of Air Miles and other loyalty reward programs, these arrangements would
attempt to bind the user to a select group of Internet sites. Should it succeed, it
would have the effect of balkanizing the Internet into groupings of sub-nets that
would discourage change and innovation in favour of stasis and the status quo. At
least one analyst has argued that the net neutrality debate is essentially about issues
related to innovation on the Internet. Wu has stated this position in the following
terms: “A communications network like the Internet can be seen as a platform for
a competition among application developers. [sic] Email, the web, and streaming
applications are in a battle for attention and interest of end-users. It is therefore
important that the platform be neutral to ensure the competition remains merito-
cratic” (Wu, 2005, p. 144). Finally, the whole artifice would lack transparency: the
Internet user would have no way of discerning the web of exclusive agreements
that had surreptitiously reconfigured his or her Internet experience.
The policy dilemma
It is clear at this juncture in the evolution of the Internet that a reaffirmation of
traditional common-carrier principles of non-discrimination is required. A policy
of non-discrimination is consistent with both the history and the culture of “best-
efforts” routing practices that were so successful in developing the Internet. The
fact that network operators currently manage traffic in order to improve the effi-
ciency of networks should not be confused with application discrimination for the
purpose of extracting profits. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the principal
technical justification for the purposeful shaping of traffic, the problem of
scarcity, does not hold up under scrutiny. While price discrimination may be
acceptable under conditions of true market competition, the emerging oligopolis-
tic market for broadband access, composed of telephone and cable companies,
will afford ample opportunity for these firms to use their market power to distort
prices, stifle competition, and impede innovation. As the Internet market has
become more and more concentrated both vertically and horizontally, with com-
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petitive conditions becoming more and more of a mirage, it is more important
than ever to recognize the status of network operators as true “carriers” operating
at the crossroads of commerce and the exchange of ideas. 
But enshrining neutrality principles in law in order to “save the Internet” only
resolves half of the problem. This is the case because it leaves unresolved the
issue of how to finance infrastructure development. As the broadband rollout pro-
ceeds, evidence is mounting that the entire process is fraught with risk and may
not be economically sustainable (Weiland, 2006). Little consideration has been
given to the possibility that consumer take-up of broadband offerings may be
slower than anticipated, prompting the telcos to slow or actually halt investment.
Should this occur, it would be tempting to discount the telco predicament as self-
inflicted or inevitable, but this would be extremely short-sighted from a public-
policy point of view. In order to understand why this is the case, some historical
perspective is required. 
For over three decades, North American policymakers have faced a unique
opportunity clothed in a significant challenge. Unlike Europe and most of the rest
of the world, the United States and Canada entered the deregulatory era with two
mature wire-line industries: telephone and cable. Each network had its strengths.
The cable industry had the bandwidth but lacked the switched architecture; the
telephone network had the architecture but not the bandwidth. The challenge for
policymakers has been to create incentives for the cable industry to diversify into
the business of switched (addressable) services while simultaneously encourag-
ing the telephone companies to replace their copper networks with fibre. As we
have noted, the costs of such an investment are estimated to be in the hundreds
of billions of dollars. This is particularly the case with respect to the telcos
because upgrading to broadband requires them to replace the entire network of
“last mile,” copper wire that links local central offices to each and every home.
The “last-mile” component of the legacy telephone networks represents a signif-
icant sunk investment, one that cannot be sold off or economically duplicated by
potential competitors. Elsewhere we have argued that the sunk costs associated
with last-mile technology were the principle justification for natural monopoly in
the legacy telephone business (Wilson, 2000).
Should the telcos withdraw their plans to deploy fibre optics, the market for
residential broadband would become the exclusive domain of the cable industry.
This would represent a significant failure of public policy. Eventually, it could
spell the demise of facilities-based competition for broadband access, a corner-
stone of network policy for over two decades.
A policy for infrastructure development
Implementing a successful policy for broadband requires that we step back from
the current deregulatory paradigm of market economics. Clearly, the issue should
be framed in terms of infrastructure development and not greedy applications or
bandwidth scarcity. Moreover, the issue of infrastructure development has histor-
ically been the subject of interest and intervention by the state. It is as old as
Munn v. Illinois (1877) in the United States (Wilson, 2000). In Canada, public-
sector participation in infrastructure development is as old as the Canadian gov-
ernment’s nation-building investment in the railroad sector (Wilson, 2000).
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Having rejected the questionable premise that infrastructure investment should be
left entirely to the marketplace, we may begin to imagine some of the ways in
which the state, under the guise of regulation, may intervene to advance univer-
sal broadband. 
It is important to remember that collectivizing the costs of network develop-
ment was a key to the development of the early telephone network. Furthermore,
the problem is well known within the field of network economics as the problem
of “positive externalities.” Simply stated, externalities are consequences of eco-
nomic activity that are not taken into account in the market price. For example, a
negative externality would be the costs of pollution that are borne by regions that
are down-wind from a polluting source but not accounted for in the price of local
hydro service. In the early history of the telephone network, a key externality was
related to the inability or unwillingness of potential subscribers to take into con-
sideration the value of their subscription to the entire community of telephone
users. In this instance, the externality is referred to as a positive externality.
In a communications network, such as the telephone network, the value
of the network to all subscribers increases as the number of subscribers
increases. A network that enables a caller to reach millions of potential
subscribers is infinitely more useful and, therefore, valuable than one
that reaches only ten subscribers. But this characteristic of the network
may not play a part in the individual subscriber’s decision to subscribe,
or more importantly not to subscribe, to the service. (Wilson, 2000,
p. 58)
The regulatory response to the existence of positive externalities was the pol-
icy instrument known as cross-subsidization: “the economic transfer from one
class of subscribers to another [enabled] the regulator to compensate for imper-
fections in the pricing system that [did] not take into account the collective ben-
efit to all subscribers of maximizing the number of telephone users” (Wilson,
2000, p. 59). 
Broadband networks exhibit the same positive externalities as the early tele-
phone network. In the current deregulatory/pro-competitive era, where the prob-
lem of infrastructure development has been framed in terms of broadband access,
the CRTC has underscored the vital link between “technological neutrality” (that
is, inter alia, application non-discrimination) and “facilities-based competition”:
The Commission has also recognized the importance of regulation that
incents [sic] new investment in Canadian telecommunications infrastruc-
ture in order to improve the quality of service and service innovation. As
mentioned above, in the days of rate of return regulation, this was done
through granting the telephone companies a high enough rate of return
on investment to finance new infrastructure and by approving construc-
tion programs. In the new competitive environment, a policy of techno-
logical neutrality doesn’t mean that the Commission is necessarily
technology blind. Rather, the Commission’s role is a more subtle one of
encouraging facilities-based competition and trying to ensure that its
policies do not act as a damper on new investment. (CRTC, 2005, p. 48)
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It is important to emphasize that a policy to promote facilities-based compe-
tition while respecting principles of technological neutrality would be compatible
with efforts designed to collectivize the costs of infrastructure development.
A public policy for broadband infrastructure would have to respect a number
of principles and policy precedents. It would have to recognize as a matter of
principle that it is in the public interest to:
• maintain and promote facilities-based competition in the market for
broadband access; 
• collectivize the costs of investment in broadband in recognition of
network externalities;
• promote broadband universality;
• maintain the non-discriminatory Internet protocol of “best effort/first
come, first served” as the basis for the movement of traffic on broad-
band networks; and
• reaffirm the status of broadband carriers as common carriers.
Once a consensus exists on these principles, a twofold approach to financing
broadband infrastructure could include 1) the use of public funds to subsidize
broadband development in rural areas, and 2) allowing broadband carriers to tax
video content at the transmission source, but on a regulated basis, subject to CRTC
(or FCC) supervision. This policy would be designed specifically and exclusively
to support the introduction of last-mile fibre optic technology. The amount of the
video tariff would be set by the regulatory agency with all proceeds being re-
invested in local broadband. Moreover, revenues derived from the video tax would
have to be matched by investment on the part of the broadband carrier according
to a formula (ratio) determined by the regulator. For example, every dollar derived
from the video tariff would have to be matched by two dollars (or more) of carrier
investment. Tariffs would only apply to video content. More importantly, broad-
band carriers would be forbidden from engaging in premium-service agreements
or taxing other types of content, including websites, gaming, and music files. It
would be up to the regulator, in concert with the broadband carriers, to determine
the minimum throughput speeds that would qualify as broadband carriage.
While it is important to oppose the broadband carriers’ efforts to employ deep
packet inspection to reconfigure the Internet according to their economic interests,
it is just as important, from a public-policy standpoint, to re-frame the debate on
Internet neutrality. A more enlightened discussion would emphasize the impor-
tance of collectivizing the costs of infrastructure investment as part of a long-term
strategy designed to promote universal broadband under a framework of facilities-
based competition involving both the telephone and the cable industries.
References
Bachula, Gary R. (2006). Testimony of Gary R. Bachula, Vice President, Internet2, before
the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
Hearing on Net Neutrality, February 7, 2006.
Barnard, Patrick. (2006, January 11). A two-tiered Internet in our future? Free Press. URL:
http://www.freepress.net/news/13287 [October 12, 2006].
98 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (1)
Belson, Ken. (2006, October 31). Profit at Verizon bolstered by wireless unit. New York Times
online. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/technology/31verizon.html
[October 31, 2006].
Bennett, Jonathan. (2006, May 23). Berners-Lee calls for net neutrality. CNET News.com.
URL: http://news.com.com/2100-1036_3-6075472.html [October 5, 2006].
Canada. (1880). Bell Canada special act, S.C. 1880, c. 67. (Special Act of Parliament)
Canada. (1993, June 23). An Act respecting telecommunications (“Telecommunications
Act”), S.C. 1993, c. 38. 
Canada. Industry Canada. (2006). Telecommunications Policy Review Panel Final Report.
Canada. National Broadband Task Force. (2001). The new national dream: Networking the
nation for broadband access. Ottawa, ON: Industry Canada. 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). (1984, July
12). Telecom Decision CRTC 84–18. Enhanced services. Ottawa, ON.
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). (2005, August
15). Canadian Telecommunications Policy Review, Discussion Paper.
Chester, Jeff. (2006). Hijacking the Internet: How big cable and phone companies’ plans
for broadband threaten democracy. Center for Digital Democracy. URL:
http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=06/02/04/2044227 [January 8, 2008]. 
Cisco Systems Inc. (2005). Deploying premium services using Cisco service control technol-
ogy. Copied to Center for Digital Democracy. URL: http://www.cisco.com/ applica-
tion/pdf/en/us/guest/products/ps6150/c1031/cdccont_0900aecd8025258e.pdf.
Goodman, Lee-Anne. (2007, February 6). Government documents suggest Tories not nerv-
ous about ISPs interfering with Net. Canadian Press. URL: http://www.cbc.ca/cp/
business/070206/b0206149A.html [July 17, 2007]. 
Horwitz, Robert Britt. (1989). The irony of regulatory reform: The deregulation of
American telecommunications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Malik, Om. (2003). Broadbandits: Inside the $750 billion telecom heist. Hoboken, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Mark, Roy. (2006, August 21). FTC chief cool on net neutrality. Internetnews.com. URL:
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3627576 [October 12, 2006].
McCullagh, Declan. (2006, May 5). Verizon scorns net neutrality fight: Web favouritism
fears are “hypothetical.” Silicon.com. URL: http://networks.silicon.com/web-
watch/0,39024667,39158681,00.htm [July 5, 2006].
McTaggart, Craig. (2006). Was the Internet ever neutral? 34th Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference. September 28–30, 2006. George Mason University School
of Law, Arlington, VA.
Meinrath, Sascha D., & Pickard, Victor W. (2006). The new network neutrality: Criteria
for Internet freedom. 34th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference.
September 28-30, 2006. George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA.
O’Connell, Patricia. (2005, November 7). Online extra: At SBC, it’s all about “scale and
scope.” BusinessWeek Online. URL: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine
/content/05_45/b3958092.htm [October 5, 2006].
Peha, Jon M. (2006). The benefits and risks of mandating network neutrality, and the quest
for a balanced policy. 34th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference.
September 28-30, 2006. George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA.
Wilson / The Last Mile: Service Tiers vs. Infrastructure Development 99
Reardon, Marguerite. (2006, June 5). FCC chairman sounds off on net neutrality and
national franchises. CNET News.com. URL: http://news.com.com/2061-10785_3-
6080314.html [October 12, 2006].
Supreme Court of Canada. (1989). Alberta Government Telephones [AGT] and Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and CNCP
Telecommunications (CNCP) 98 N.R. 161. 
Supreme Court of the United States. (2005, June 27). National Cable &
Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services. (04–277) 345 F.3d 1120,
reversed and remanded.
Tremblay, Gaëtan. (1997). La théorie des industries culturelles face aux progrès de la
numérisation et de la convergence. Sciences de la Société, 40, 11–23.
United States. (1996). Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56. 
United States. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2005, September 23).
Appropriate framework for broadband access to the Internet over wireline facili-
ties. FCC 05-150, 2005 WL 2347773.
United States v. Western Electric Co. (1956). Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
United States Senate. (2006a). 109th Congress, 2d session, S. 2360. Internet Non-
Discrimination Act of 2006.
United States Senate. (2006b). 109th Congress, 2d session, S. 2686. To amend the
Communications Act of 1934 and for other purposes. (Short title: Communications,
Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006)
United States Senate. (2006c). 109th Congress, 2d session, S.2917. Internet Freedom
Preservation.
Weiland, Ken. (2006, November 1). The big broadband gamble: An exclusive
Telecommunications® survey reveals the high levels of risk that operators are 
consciously taking with their broadband investment. Telecommunications Online.
URL: http://www.telecommagazine.com/International/article.asp?HH_ID= AR_2539
[November 1, 2006].
Wilson, Kevin G. (2000). Deregulating telecommunications: U.S. and Canadian telecom-
munications, 1840-1997. New York, NY: Roman and Littlefield.
Wilson, Kevin G. (2003). Spinning competition: Convergence, concentration and public
policy in Canada’s new media/communications landscape. In B. Miège & G.
Tremblay (Eds.), 2001 Bogues: Globalism et pluralism (pp. 242–269). Laval, QC:
Les Presses de l’Université Laval. 
Wu, Tim. (2005). Network neutrality, broadband discrimination. Journal on Telecom-
munications and High Technology Law, 2, 141–179.
100 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (1)
